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RECENT CASES.
Telegraph Companies- ffegligene-.Damage.- The Supreme
Court of Iowa in the recent case of Garrett v. Western Union Tele-
graph CO., 49 N. W. Rep. 88, has decided for that State the rights
and obligations of telegraph companies. The plaintiff, a cattle
dealer, living in Iowa, wired his correspondent in Chicago: "Send
me market, Kansas City, to-morrow and next day." Plaintiff had
wired from this office on several occasions. There was an agree-
ment that if market remained unchanged the correspondents were
not to answer, and plaintiff would buy as per prices of market at
last wiring. Defendant neglected to deliver message to correspon-
dent, owing to negligence of its employees, and from the evidence
deduced would leave it uncertain whether the message was ever
taken from the hook. There was a stipulation in the message to
the effect that plaintiff wvould not hold defendant liable for "errors,
delays, or non-delivery of the message happening from any
cause, beyond a sum equal to ten times amount paid for sending
it." Upon an appeal from the lower court, this court held : That
the stipulation in the message did not apply to company's negli-
gence to make an attempt to send the message, as a telegraph
company cannot stipulate against its own negligence; and sec-
ondly, that the words of the message advised the defendant that
the plaintiff was on his way to Kansas City, and desired the state
of the Chicago market, and that it was a proper question to sub-
mit to the jury as to whether the defendant ought to be charged
with knowledge that the plaintiff intended to act upon the result
of his message ; and thirdly, that the damages were t-ot those
stipulated for in the message, but that the jury should have been
directed to determine whether the plaintiff acted upon the absence
of an answer from his correspondent, and whether loss, if any, was
proximate or remote, contrasting case of Tel. Co. v. Hall, 124
U. S. 444, and that plaintiff was entitled to damages he sustained
by acting upon the absence of. an answer. As to the question of
the duty of plaintiff to ascertain Chicago market from bulletin at
Kansas City, this court says it was not a question of law, but of
fact for the jury, and consequently not within its province.
RECENT CASES.
Princpal and Agent-Rights of Princi.al-Duties of Agent.-In
Eunean v. Rieger et al., i6 S. W. Rep. 854 (Mo.), the court sets out
at length the strictness to which an agent is held in dealings with
his principal. Eunean, who lived in the Indian Territory, owned
a house in Kansas City which had been condemned as unsafe.
After an inspection of the house, he authorized Rieger, his agent,
to sell it and the lot for $4,500.00. Rieger sold the property to
Mills, an impecunious acquaintance, agreeing to save him harm-
less and take the property himself if Mills could not pay for it.
Of the transaction with Mills, Rieger fully informed Eunean, who
was satisfied therewith. Afterwards Mills conveyed the property
to Rieger's brother who in turn conveyed it to Rieger himself. Of
this last conveyance Rieger did not tell Eunean till about a month
before this suit was brought. The property was worth $12,000.00.
The court ordered a re-conveyance to Eunean. In the decision
Thomas, J., says: "He [Rieger] was the plaintiff's agent in
respect of this property, and it was his duty as such to get as much
for it as possible ; the law will not permit him to reap an advan-
tage he has acquired by reason of his confidential relation. Nor
does it make any difference that plaintiff may have known that
defendant was to become the owner of the property in a certain
contingency, and that he did in fact become the owner of it. The
only question a Court of Equity will ask, in the investigation of
transactions between parties sustaining a confidential relation to
each other, is whether an advantage has been obtained by virtue
of that relation. * * * The fairness or unfairness of the
transaction will not be considered in such case. An agent cannot
serve two masters. If he undertakes to act for himself and at the
same time for his principal, and reaps an advantage by his double
dealing, the law will take it from him, unless the principal, know-
ing all the facts, has allowed the agent to so change his condition
that he cannot be put in statu quo, and thus make it inequitable to
rescind the contract." Citing Michaud v. Girod, 4 How. 503;
Story on Agency, § 210.
Electric Street Railways-Rights of Tele hone Com anies in Streets.
-The Supreme Court of Ohio in a recent case (Cincinnati Inc.
Plane R'y. Co. v. Cio and Sub. Telegraph Ass'n, 48 Ohio St., 27 N.
E. Rep. 89o) has considered the question as to the respective rights
of electric railroad and telephone companies when operating
lines in the same street. The telephone company attempted to
enjoin the railroad from employing the ground circuit for the
return current of electricity, claiming such use seriously interfered
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with the working of their wires in that vicinity. The Supreme
Court refused the injunction, holding that no exclusive rights to the
use of the ground circuit existed in the association, it being an ele-
mentary principle of science discovered forty years prior to the
invention of the telephone. Neither was there any vested interest
in the association by virtue of prior use and operation in the street.
"The primary and dominant purpose for which streets were estab-
lished was to facilitate travel and transportation; they belong from
side to side and end to end to the public, for public use. The tele-
phone poles, wires and appliances are not among the original and-
primary objects for which streets were opened. As a general rule,
an occupation of the streets, otherwise than for purposes of travel
and transportation, is presumptively inferior and subservient to
the dominant easement of the public for highway purposes; and
the fact that permission is given to occupy the streets for other
purposes does not confer a prior and paramount right to occupy
them, to the exclusion of their use for travel in a mode different
from what obtained when such permission was given. As against
the railroad company, the telephone company has no vested
interest and exclusive rights in and to the use of the ground cir-
cuit in the streets as a part of the telephone system."
An opposite view has been taken in the lower courts of New
York in Hud. Riv. Tel. Co. v. Watervliet Turnpike and R. R. Co.,
decided Sept. ioth, and the decision in the Court of Appeals will
be awaited with interest.
Contributory Negligence-Proximate Cause- Smithwick v. Hall
Upson Co., 59 Conn. 261.-The plaintiff, employed in storing an ice
house, was warned to keep away from a certain part of the plat-
form which had no railing and was slippery. Plaintiff disobeyed,
and the wall falling, he was knocked to the ground and injured-
Upon these facts the defendant contended that the plaintiff was
guilty of such contributory negligence as to bar his right to
recover more than nominal damages. But as his injury was not
the result of the manifest perils, but was caused through the neg-
ligence of the defendant, by the falling walls, from which source
he had no reason to anticipate the slightest danger, he could be
guilty of no negligence with respect to the latter by changing his
position contrary to orders, for negligence presupposes a duty of
taking care, and this in turn presupposes knowledge or its legal
equivalent. The defendant seems to claim, however, that
although some of the plaintiff's injuries were caused by falling
bricks, yet most of them were caused by his fall, and as he prob-
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ably would not have fallen if he had remained behind the railing,
he contributed to his injury by placing himself where there was
nothing to prevent his fall. But if the truth of this could be dem-
onstrated it would not change the relation of the plaintiff's act to
the legal cause of his injury, or make that act, from a legal tand-
point, a contributing cause when it was but a condition. And if
the claim means that the plaintiff by his act increased the injury
merely, then, if this were true, it would not be such contributory
negligence as would defeat the action. To have that effect it
must be an act or omission which contributes to the happening of
the act or event which caused the injury. An act or omission that
merely increases or adds to the extent of the loss or injury will
not have that effect, though of course it may affect the amount of
damages recovered in a given case.
Imputed Negligence- Voluntary Ex osure-Rescue.-In Pennsylvania:
Co. v. Langendorff, 48 Ohio St., 28 N. E. Rep. 172, the Supreme
Court of Ohio has discussed the question as to how far one may
expose his life in attempting to rescue another and yet not be
charged with contributory negligence if injured. In that case the
defendant was injured in attempting to rescue from in front of an
approaching train a child, who had strayed upon the track at a
street crossing where the gateman had left his post so that the
gates were not lowered. The lower court refused to charge that
thus voluntarily risking his life was negligence per se, and the
refusal is sustained by the Supreme Court. The court hold that
the question whether one so acting should be charged with con-
tributory negligence is one of mixed fact and law to be submitted
to the jury upon the evidence, with proper directions from the
court. "The law will not impute negligence to an effort to pre-
serve human life, unless made under such circumstances as to con-
stitute rashness in the judgment of prudent persons. It is difficult,
if not impossible, to lay down in advance a rule by which to deter-
mine the extent to which one may risk his safety or his life in
emergencies of this character, and not be charged with rashness;
but the emergency may be such as to warrant the assumption of a
high degree of risk, and one so situated may rightfully expect his
acts to be construed in the light of all the circumstances that com-
pelled him to their commission, and that he would not be charged
with contributory negligence, so as to defeat a right of action,
because the result showed that the risk he assumed was greater
than, in the excitement of the moment, he had contemplated." In
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such cases the injury must be attributed to the one that negligently
exposed to danger the person who required assistance.
Carriers - Nregligence - Act of God.- In Gleeson v. Virginia Mid-
land Ry. Co., ii Sup. Ct. Rep. 859, the U. S. Supreme Court held
that a land-slide in a railway cut, caused by a fall of rain not of
unusual violence, is not an act of God so as to excuse the company
from liability for an accident caused thereby. Lamar, J., who
delivered the opinion, says in the course of it: "Against such an
event it was the duty of the company to have guarded. Extraor-
dinary floods, storms of unusual violence, sudden tempests, severe
frosts, great droughts, lightnings, earthquakes, sudden deaths and
illnesses have been held to be ' acts of God'; but we know of no
instance in which a rain of not unusual violence, and the probable
results thereof in softening the superficial earth, have been so con-
sidered. * * * If it be the duty of the company (as it unques-
tionably is) in the erection of the fills and the necessary bridges,
to so construct them that they shall be reasonably safe, and to
maintain them in a reasonably safe condition, no reason can be
assigned why the same duty should not exist in regard to the cuts.
Just as surely as the laws of gravitation will cause a heavy train to
fall through a defective or rotten bridge, just so surely will those
same laws cause land-slides and the consequent dangerous obstruc-
tions to the track itself from ill-constructed railway cuts. * * *
Ordinary skill would enable the engineers to foresee the tesult,
and ordinary prudence should lead the company to guard against
it. To hold any other view would be to over-balance the price-
less lives of the travelling public by a mere item of increased
expense in the construction of railroads."
JVegligence of Sub-contractor.-An interesting case has recently
been decided in Massachusetts (Bickford v. Richards et al., 27 N. E.
Rep. 1014) in which the distinction between mere non-feasance and
mis-feasance on the part of a sub-contractor is clearly shown. B.
had made a contract for the removal of some buildings with C.,
who subsequently sub-let the contract to R. etal. The removal
was done in such an unvaorkmanlike and negligent manner
that the buildings were greatly injured, and this suit was entered
against defendants by B. for the damages. The lower court
ordered a verdict for R. there being no privity of contract between
them and B., and this decision is now reversed by the Supreme
Court. The court says, "The plaintiff's right of action does not
depend on the existence of a contract between himself and the
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defendants as would be the case were he suing for damages result-
ing from non-feasance on part of defendants, but on the fact that
defendants have negligently and wrongfully done, or caused to be
done, something to* his property which has injured it. The gist
of the action is the breach by defendants of the duty which they
owed to the plaintiff not to injure his property by any wrongful or
negligent acts of theirs. That duty did not depend on or grow out
of contract. The fact that plaintiff may have an action on the
contract against C., does not relieve the defendants from liability
to the plaintiff for their negligent and wrongful acts."
.Roarian Rights- Lands Bounded on Non-Navigable Lakes-- In
Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U. S. 371, the Supreme Court of the
United States has decided that by the common law, under a
grant of lands bounded on a non-navigable lake, the grantee takes
to the centre of the lake. Grants by the United States of its pub-
lic lands, bounded on waters, are to be construed according to the
law of the State where the lands lie; and the rule of the common
law still prevails in Illinois, notwithstanding a mere opinion of the
court, not necessary to the decision of the case, in Trustees of
Schools v. Schroll, 120 Illinois, 509, that a grant of lands bounded
by a lake does not extend to the centre thereof. Three justices
dissented, being of the opinion that, even if the common law was
as stated, which they doubted, yet the opinion in Trustees of
Schools v. Schroll, supra, amounted to a decision of the case, and
established the rule in Illinois that the title of the riparian owner
stopped at the water line. As to the value of recent English
decisions, which declare the common law, the court says, in speak-
ing of Bristow v. Cormican, 3 App. Cas. 641: "Of course this
decision has not the controlling authority which it would have had
if it had been made before our revolution. But it is the judicial
decision of the highest authority in the British empire, and is
entitled to the greatest consideration on a question like this, of
-pure common law."
Liability of Emjoyer-Proximate Cause-Contributory Negligence.-
The plaintiff was fireman on the engine of the defendant company.
The air-brake was unsafe. The plaintiff and engineer were aware
of its condition and that directed repairs had been neglected.
Application of the brake at a danger signal failed to control the
speed, where a sound brake would have stopped the train and pre-
vented the injury to the plaintiff. Upon verdict for the plaintiff,
the defendant moved for a new trial because the speed and not the
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brake was the proximate cause of the injury, and the rate of speed
too high for an unsound brake was due to the engineer's negligence;
and that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence by
remaining at work after he knew of the condition of the brake.
Wheeler, J., denied the motion (In Young v. -rew Jersey By. Co.,
46 Fed. Rep. i6o), considering that it could not be assumed as a
matter of law that the plaintiff was guilty of ifegligence in remaining
at work after knowledge of a defect whose repair had been directed.
Whether he was negligent in fact or not had been established by
the decision of the jury ; and similarly the question of proximate
cause was ordinarily for the jury. Their verdict found that both
the speed and brake were proximate causes of the injury, tonse-
quently the engineer and defendant company were joint wrong
doers, and were jointly and severally liable.
Insolvency-Discharge of Foreign Creditors- Stir et a. v. M4rc-
Quade et al., 22 At. R. 45i. The defendants, residents of New
Hampshire, were adjudged insolvent, and notice of the assign-
ment was sent to the plaintiffs, who resided in New York. The
latter, however, took no part in the proceedings, and some time
after the settlement brought suit for the amount of their claim.
The court says: "It is settled that the insolvent law of one State
has no effect in another State against the citizens of the latter
holding claims which follow the person of the creditor unless they
place themselves under the jurisdiction of the law by voluntarily
becoming parties to the insolvency proceedings. The question
presented is whether a discharge in insolvency granted* by an
insolvent court of this State to one of its own citizens is a bar to
an action brought by a citizen of another State in the courts of
this State. As the insolvency court of this State had no jurisdic-
tion over the plaintiffs as citizens of New York, the discharge
granted to the defendants was inoperative as to the plaintiffs, and
cannot be pleaded as a discharge of their claim. The plaintiffs'
debt not being extinguished, they have an equal right to enforce
the payment of it by suit in the courts of this State with other cit-
izens having claims to be enforced."
Telegraph Companies - Failure to Deliver Mffessage M ental
Anguish.-The Supreme Court of Mississippi, in Western Unionr
Telegraph Co. v. Rogers, 9 South. Rep. 823, has decided that a
telegraph company is not liable in damages for the mental anguish
inflicted on the receiver of a message announcing the death of a
relative, and the time and place of burial, when such message, by
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the negligence of the company's agent, is not delivered in time
for him to attend the funeral. The court disapproves the doc-
trine laid down in the So Relle Case, 55 Tex. 3 o8-followed by
the courts of Alabama, Indiana, Kentucky, and Tennessee-that,
in such cases, damages may be recovered for the mental anguish.
Cooper, J. says: "We are unwilling to depart from the long-
established and almost universal rule of law that no action lies for
the recovery of damages for mere mental suffering, disconnected
from physical injury, and not the result of the willful wrong of the
defendant. That such damages are recoverable in actions for
breach of contract of marriage is well settled; but it is equally
true that until recent years this action stood as the marked and
single exception in which such damages were recoverable in
actions for breach of contract."
Evidence-Parol to Vary Writing.-A peculiar case of admissi-
bility of parol testimony to vary the terms of a written instrument
arose in the case of Evans v. Duncan, 48 N . W. Rep. 922, decided by
the Supreme Court of Iowa. Defendant executed a warranty deed
to plaintiff and this suit was brought upon alleged breaches of the
covenants. On the trial defendant undertook to show that in reality'
the sale was by parol agreement with C., and that C. agreed to pay
the encumbrances as part of the purchase price. It was also alleged
by defendant that plaintiff's name was inserted as grantee merely
to secure him for the purchase price advanced to C., and that he
received the deed with knowledge of, and subject to, C.'s agree-
ment to pay the encumbrances. The question then arises, is this
testimony admissible as against the deed. The court held that
although the case is unlike any to which they have been referred,
inasmuch as the parol agreement set up is with one other than the
grantee, still, "the deed is absolute and unlimited, both as to the
grantee and covenants of warranty," and that whatever his rights
are as between him and C., the parol agreement between them is.
not admissible to contradict the terms in the deed.
Specifc perfornance of Oral Contract for conveyance of land where
the deed is deficient in quantity conveyed..-In McDonald v. Youngbluth
(46 Fed. Rep. 836, U. S. Circuit Court, S. D. Ohio.) there had been
an oral contract for the conveyance of land. The consideration
which had passed consisted in the payment of certain notes upon
which the complainants were already liable as indorsers prior to-
the oral agreement. The deed accepted in confidence without
scrutiny was found afterwards to have conveyed a smaller quantity
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*than it had been agreed upon. The defence was the statute of frauds.
Specific performance was decreed, and it was held that where a
written instrument fails through fraud to express the real terms of
the oral contract the statute of frauds does not prevent a Court of
Equity from reformation of the instrument to accord with the oral
agreement and a decree of specific performance of the contract as
thus reformed; and this power depends not on part performance
but on the control of the court over written instruments. Glass v.
Hulbert, 102 Mass. 24, noticed with disapproval as opposed to the
-weight of authority.
Liability of Counties.- Counties are said in Smith v. Board of
Commissioners, 46 Fed. Rep. 340, not to be liable for torts of
their officers, although acting in the line of their authority. Such
officials are acting ultimately under the authority of the State,
and the liability of counties for their acts is entirely of statutory
definition and limitation.
